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ABSTRACT. Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) was created in 2002 as an upper-level ontology 
to support the creation of consistent lower-level ontologies, initially in the subdomains of 
biomedical research, now also in other areas, including defense and security. BFO is current-
ly undergoing revisions in preparation for the release of BFO version 2.0. We summarize 
some of the proposed revisions in what follows, focusing on BFO’s treatment of material en-
tities, and specifically of the category object.  
1  Introduction 
BFO is one of three leading public domain upper-level ontologies used in scientific 
and other contexts, 1  alongside DOLCE (the Domain Ontology for Linguistic and 
Cognitive Engineering) [Gangemi et al. 2002] and SUMO (the Suggested Upper 
Merged Ontology) [Niles and Pease 2001]. BFO differs from the latter, however, in 
being a strict upper level ontology. Unlike DOLCE and SUMO, it does not contain its 
own representations of physical, chemical, biological, psychological, or other types of 
entities which would properly fall within the domains of the special sciences. BFO is 
therefore, in contrast to these other ontologies, very small, and thus more manageable 
as an artifact designed for purposes of ontological engineering. As will become clear, 
however, even a small ontology can bring large challenges from a logico-
metaphysical point of view. 
BFO is concerned only with what exists (which means in practice: only with those 
sorts of entities for which we have good – for example empirical-scientific reason to 
believe that they exist; thus not with unicorns, sprites, or absent fingers). BFO then 
adopts an approach to ontology which sees what exists as being divided along three 
orthogonal dimensions.  
First, BFO recognizes a dichotomy between occurrents and continuants. The for-
mer are either processual entities (events, actions, procedures ...) which unfold over a 
-------------------------------- 
1 The BFO website at http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/ contains a list of some 98 projects and re-
search groups using BFO as a top-level ontology to support semantic interoperability. 
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span of time from their beginning to their ending, or they are the beginnings and end-
ings themselves (their process boundaries) or the spans of time (and of spacetime) 
which such entities occupy. The latter are the participants in such processes, entities 
that endure during the period of their existence, and the spatial boundaries of such 
entities, as well as the spatial regions in which they are located.  
Second, BFO recognizes a dichotomy between independent and dependent entities. 
Cells and organs are independent continuants; a quality of a cell (for example: its 
mass or volume) is a dependent continuant – this mass and this volume are dependent 
on the cell in the sense that, should the latter cease to exist, then so also would the 
former.  
Third, BFO rests on a distinction between instances (individuals, tokens, particu-
lars) and universals (generals, types, kinds). It furnishes formal specifications for the 
high-level formal universals (called ‘categories’ in what follows) which can be de-
fined in terms of these three dichotomies, and also of a set of relations which link 
them [Smith et al. 2005]. The terms in BFO and in the domain ontologies based on 
BFO consist of preferred labels representing what is general in reality. Universals are 
most clearly illustrated by considering the general terms – such as ‘electron’ or ‘cell’ 
– employed by scientific theories in the formulation of general truths [Smith and
Ceusters 2010]. However, universals include also the general entities referred to by 
general terms employed in domains such as engineering, commerce, administration 
and intelligence analysis. BFO was designed to work with entities within the province 
of the natural sciences, especially biology, its coverage domain embraces also social 
and psychological entities such as military units and counterinsurgency operations, 
mortgage contracts and relations of ownership, poems and experimental protocols. 
We use ‘universal’ and ‘type’ in what follows as synonyms. Universals exist at vari-
ous levels of generality, starting at the most general and domain-neutral level treated of 
by BFO, and proceeding from there to less general universals such as person, vehicle, 
disease, and so forth. 
2 Continuant 
A continuant is an entity that persists, endures, or continues to exist through time 
while maintaining its identity. Continuants can preserve their identity even while gain-
ing and losing material parts. If a is a continuant, then there is some temporal interval 
(referred to below as a one-dimensional temporal region) during which a exists.  
Continuants are contrasted with occurrents, which unfold themselves in successive 
temporal phases. Continuants have only continuants as parts, just as occurrents have 
only occurrents as parts. Continuants, as BFO understands them, are three-dimensional 
entities (entities extended in three spatial dimensions); occurrents are four-dimensional 
entities (entities extended also in the dimension of time).  
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3 Material entity 
The most important sub-category of continuants, for BFO, is that of material entities, 
which are continuants that include some portion of matter as part, where ‘portion of 
matter’ is understood in the broadest possible sense to include also undetached portions 
of matter such as your head and scattered portions of matter such as the Buffalo Sym-
phony Orchestra. Every material entity is localized in space. Every material entity can 
move in space. Every entity which has a material entity as part is a material entity. 
A portion of matter is anything that includes elementary particles among its proper or 
improper parts: quarks and leptons, including electrons, as the smallest particles thus far 
discovered; baryons (including protons and neutrons) at a higher level of granularity; 
atoms and molecules at still higher levels, forming the cells, organs, organisms and 
other material entities studied by biologists, the portions of rock studied by geologists, 
the fossils studied by paleontologists, and so on. 
BFO allows material entities to have immaterial entities as parts; for example the in-
terior (or ‘lumen’) of your small intestine is a part of your body, your left nasal cavity is 
a part of your nose, the interior of the railway carriage is a part of the train.  
In what follows we define three children of ‘material entity’ – namely ‘object’, ‘ob-
ject aggregate’; and ‘fiat object part’. This is intended not as an exhaustive classification 
of material entities, but rather as a selection of three subtypes of particular importance 
in many areas of natural and social science. 
4 Object 
4.1 Natural and engineered units of matter 
BFO rests on the presupposition that at multiple micro-, meso- and macroscopic 
scales reality exhibits certain stable, spatially separated or separable material units, 
combined, or combinable, into aggregates of various sorts (for example organisms into 
what are called ‘populations’). Such units play a central role in almost all domains of 
natural science from particle physics to cosmology. Many scientific laws govern the 
units in question, employing general terms (such as ‘molecule’ or ‘planet’) referring to 
the types and subtypes of units, and also to the types and subtypes of the processes 
through which such units develop and interact. The division of reality into such natural 
units is at the heart of biological science. So too is the fact these units may form higher-
level units (as cells form multicellular organisms) and that they may also form aggre-
gates of units, for example, as cells form portions of tissue and organs form families, 
herds, breeds, species, and so on.  
 At the same time, the division of certain portions of reality into engineered units 
(manufactured artifacts) is the basis of modern industrial technology, which rests on the 
distributed mass production of engineered parts through division of labor and on their 
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assembly into larger, compound units such as cars and laptops. The division of portions 
of reality into units is one starting point for the phenomenon of counting.  
Examples of units of special importance for the purposes of natural science include: 
atom, molecule, organelle, cell, organism, grain of sand, planet, star. These material 
entities are candidate examples of what are called ‘objects’ in BFO 2.0. Such units are 
sometimes referred to as ‘grains’ [Jansen and Schulz 2011], and are associated with 
specific ‘levels of granularity’ in what is seen as a layered structure of reality, with units 
at lower and more fine-grained levels being combined as parts into grains at higher, 
coarse-grained levels. Our proposals here are consistent with, but are formulated inde-
pendently of such granularity considerations.  
4.2  Three focal examples 
The following elucidation documents a set of conditions to be used when deciding 
whether entities of a given type should be represented as objects in the BFO sense. It 
rests on three candidate groups of focal examples, namely:  
 
1. organisms, cells and biological entities of certain other sorts, including organs 
2. portions of solid matter such as rocks and lumps of iron 
3. engineered artifacts such as watches and cars. 
 
Material entities under all of these headings are all causally relatively isolated enti-
ties in Ingarden’s sense [Ingarden 1970, Smith and Brogaard 2003]. This means that 
they are both structured through a certain type of causal unity and maximal relative to 
this type of causal unity.  
 We first characterize causal unity in general. We then distinguish three types of 
causal unity corresponding to the three candidate families of objects listed above (cells 
and organisms, solid portions of matter, machines and other engineered artifacts). We 
then describe what it is for an entity to be maximal relative to one or other of these types, 
and formulate in these terms an elucidation of what BFO means by ‘object’.  
 
a is causally unified means: a is a material entity such that its material parts are tied 
together in such a way that, in environments typical for entities of the type in ques-
tion, 
 
 if b is a part a in the interior of a at t that is larger than a certain threshold size 
(which will be determined differently from case to case, depending on factors 
such as porosity of external cover) and if b is moved in space to be at t at a lo-
cation on the exterior of the spatial region that had been occupied by a at t, 
then either a’s other parts will be moved in coordinated fashion or a will be 
damaged (be affected, for example, by breakage or tearing) in the interval be-
tween t and t. 
 causal changes in one part of a can have consequences for other parts of a 
without the mediation of any entity that lies on the exterior of a. 
Keio University Press Inc. 2012 
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Material entities with no proper material parts (some smallest microparticle) would 
satisfy these conditions trivially. Candidate examples of types of causal unity for mate-
rial entities of more complex sorts are as follows (this is not intended to be an exhaus-
tive list): 
  
CU1: Causal unity via physical covering 
 
Here the parts in the interior of the unified entity are combined together causally 
through a common membrane or other physical covering – what the FMA refers to as a 
‘bona fide anatomical surface’ [Rosse and Mejino 2007]. The latter points outwards 
toward and may serve a protective function in relation to what lies on the exterior of the 
entity.  
Note that the physical covering may have holes (for example pores in your skin, 
shafts penetrating the planet’s outer crust, sockets where conduits to other entities are 
connected allowing transport of electric current or of liquids or gases). The physical 
covering is nonetheless connected in the sense that (a) between every two points on its 
surface a continuous path can be traced which does not leave this surface, and also (b) 
the covering serves as a barrier preventing entities above a certain size threshold from 
entering from the outside or escaping from the inside. 
Some organs in the interior of complex organisms manifest a causal unity of this type. 
Organs can survive detachment from their surroundings, for example in the case of 
transplant, with their membranes intact. The FMA defines ‘organ’ as follows:  
 
An anatomical structure which has as its direct parts portions of two or more types of tissue 
or two or more types of cardinal organ part which constitute a maximally connected anatom-
ical structure demarcated predominantly by a bona fide anatomical surface. Examples: femur, 
biceps, liver, heart, skin, tracheobronchial tree, ovary. [Rosse and Mejino 2007] 
 
CU2: Causal unity via internal physical forces  
 
Here the material parts of a material entity are combined together causally by suffi-
ciently strong physical forces, for example, by fundamental forces of strong and weak 
interaction, by covalent or ionic bonds, by metallic bonding, or more generally by forces 
of a type which makes the overall sum of forces strong enough to act in such a way as to 
hold the object together relative to the strength of attractive or destructive forces in its 
ordinary environmental neighborhood. (Few solid portions of matter in our everyday 
environment would survive very long on the face of a neutron star, but luckily that is 
not our everyday environment.) In the case of larger portions of matter the constituent 
atoms are tightly bound to each other in a geometric lattice, either regularly (as in the 
case of portions of metal) or irregularly (as in an amorphous solid such as a portion of 
glass). Examples: atoms, molecules, grains of sand, lumps of iron. 
 
CU3: Causal unity via engineered assembly of components 
 
Here the material parts of a material entity are combined together via mechanical as-
semblies joined for example through screws or other fasteners. The assemblies often 
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involve parts which are reciprocally engineered to fit together, as in the case of dovetail 
joints, balls and bearings, nuts and bolts. A causal unity of this sort can be interrupted 
for a time, as when a watch is disassembled for repair, and then recreated in its original 
state. The parts of an automobile, including the moving parts, constitute an object be-
cause of their relative rigidity: while these parts may move with respect to each other, a 
given gear cannot move e.g., 10 ft., while the other parts do not.  
 We can now elucidate what it means for a material entity to be maximal relative to 
one or other of these three types of causal unity as follows:  
 To say that a is maximal relative to some criterion of causal unity CUn means: 
 
a is causally unified relative to CUn at t 
& if (for some t and b, a is a part of b at t & b is causally unified relative to the 
same CUn) then (a and b are identical) 
 
Examples of maximality relative to the causal unity criterion CU1 are: a cell or organism 
is maximal; your lower torso falls short of maximality; a pair of cells exceeds maximali-
ty; relative to CU2: a continuous dumbbell-shaped lump of iron is maximal; the connect-
ing portion falls short of maximality; a pair of such dumbbell-shaped lumps exceeds 
maximality; and relative to CU3: an armored vehicle is maximal; the portions of armor 
of an armored vehicle falls short of maximality; a pair of armored vehicles exceeds 
maximality. 
4.3 Objects can have other objects as parts 
We cannot define ‘object’ in BFO simply by asserting that an entity is an object if 
and only if it is maximal relative to some causal unity criterion, however. This is be-
cause objects under all three of the identified headings may have other, smaller objects 
as parts. A spark plug is an object; when inserted into a car to replace a defective plug, it 
remains an object, but ceases to be maximal. Importantly, however, the spark plug as 
installed still instantiates a universal many instances of which are maximal. This sug-
gests that we define object as follows: 
 
a is an object =Def. a is a material entity which  
manifests causal unity of one or other of the types CUn listed above  
& is of a type instances of which are maximal relative to this criterion of 
causal unity. 
 
Objects can be joined to other objects, not only through engineering but also in biol-
ogy, as for example in Fig. 2. 
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 by containing objects which are connected by conduits or tracts which may 
themselves have covering membranes. 
4.4 Conjoined twins 
Some objects may change type from one time to the next (a fetus becomes a baby, 
which in turn becomes a child). Objects may also fuse or be separated. Two boats may 
be combined to form a single multihulled boat. Conjoined twins may be successfully 
separated.  
Whether each one of a pair of conjoined twins is or is not an object is not a trivial 
question, and the treatment of this case ontologically should be viewed as an experi-
mental matter, with different alternatives tested to see which yield the most coherent 
solution for different sorts of cases. Different types of conjoined twins will need to be 
treated differently, and in cases where twins do not share vital organs an identification 
of each one of the pair as an object will yield a workable solution. Certainly, the maxi-
mal CU1-causally unified material entity here is the whole which they together form; 
accepting each twin as an object even prior to separation – thus as an instance of the 
material universal human being – is, however, consistent with our elucidation of 
BFO:object.  
5 Object aggregate 
An object aggregate is a material entity consisting exactly of a plurality of objects as 
continuant parts.  
More formally: 
  
If a is an object aggregate, then if a exists at t, there are objects o1, …,on at t 
such that: 
   for all x (x part of a at t iff x overlaps some oi at t) 
An entity a is an object aggregate if and only if there is a mutually exhaustive and 
pairwise disjoint partition of a into objects [Bittner and Smith 2008]. Examples are: a 
symphony orchestra, the aggregate of bearings in a constant velocity axle joint, the 
nitrogen atoms in the atmosphere, a collection of cells in a blood biobank. 
The objects which form the proximal parts of an aggregate – those parts which de-
termine the aggregate as an aggregate – are called its member parts (sometimes referred 
to as ‘granular parts’).  
Different sorts of examples will satisfy further conditions, for example an organiza-
tion is an aggregate whose member parts have roles of specific types (for example in a 
jazz band, a chess club, a football team); a swarm of bees is an aggregate of members 
who are linked together through natural bonds. 
Object aggregates may be defined through physical attachment (the aggregate of at-
oms in a lump of granite), or through physical containment (the aggregate of molecules 
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Examples are: the upper and lower lobes of the left lung, the dorsal and ventral surfaces 
of the body, the Western hemisphere of the Earth, the FMA:regional parts of an intact 
human body. 
Since fiat object parts are material entities, they are also extended in space in three 
dimensions (in contrast to fiat continuant boundaries, introduced below). 
Fiat object parts are contrasted with bona fide object parts, which are themselves ob-
jects (for example: a cell is a bona fide object part of a multi-cellular organism), and are 
marked by bona fide boundaries, or in other words, by physical discontinuities (for 
example: between the surface of your skin, or your laptop, and the surrounding body of 
air) [Smith 2001]. Most examples of fiat object parts are associated with theoretically 
drawn divisions (for example: the division of the brain into regions or the division of the 
planet into hemispheres), or with divisions drawn by cognitive subjects for practical 
reasons, such as the division of a cake (before slicing) into (what will become) slices 
(member parts of an object aggregate). However, this does not mean that fiat object 
parts are dependent for their existence on divisions or delineations effected by cognitive 
subjects. If, for example, it is correct to conceive geological layers of the Earth as fiat 
object parts of the Earth, then even though these layers were first delineated in recent 
times, still they existed long before such delineation and what holds of these layers (for 
example that the oldest layers are also the lowest layers) did not begin to hold because 
of our acts of delineation. 
7 Treatment of Problem Cases 
Examples viewed by some as problematic cases for the trichotomy of fiat object part, 
object, and object aggregate include:  
 
a mussel on (and attached to) a rock, a slime mold, a pizza, a cloud, a galaxy, a 
railway train with engine and multiple carriages, a clonal stand of quaking as-
pen3, a bacterial community (biofilm), a broken femur.  
 
Note that, as Aristotle already clearly recognized, such problematic cases – which lie 
at or near the penumbra of instances defined by the categories in question – need not 
invalidate these categories. The existence of grey objects does not prove that there are 
not objects which are black and objects which are white; the existence of mules does not 
prove that there are not objects which are donkeys and objects which are horses. It does, 
however, show that the examples in question need to be addressed carefully in order to 
show how they can be fitted into the proposed scheme – that the scheme requires addi-
tional subdivisions or amendments of other sorts. Where users of BFO need to annotate 
-------------------------------- 
  3 http://scienceblogs.com/evolvingthoughts/2007/08/what_is_an_individual.php 
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data pertaining to such problematic cases, then they may in every case use 
BFO:material entity in formulating the corresponding annotations.  
Already it is clear that BFO or its conformant domain-ontologies will in due course 
need to recognize also other sub-universals of material entity, in addition to object, 
object aggregate and fiat object part – for instance: aggregate of fiat object parts [Vogt 
2010, Vogt et al. 2012].  
Thus the treatment of material entity in BFO 2.0 should not be associated with any 
closure axiom pertaining to the three distinguished categories, and the existing treatment 
of the three identified sub-universals should not be associated with any claim to exhaus-
tivity. 
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